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Introduction
Some philosophers have the sense that morality loses some of its significance if
there is no realm of objective moral fact. If morality is just grounded in our
emotions, the thought goes, then its demands cannot have absolute authority
over us; only the hardness of metaphysical fact can support the hardness of the
moral “ought.” And so the normative importance of morality seems to depend
on moral realism, the view that there are mind-independent moral truths.1 As
Derek Parfit put it (rather bleakly),
If there were no such truths, there would be no point in trying to
make good decisions. Nothing would matter, and there would not
be better or worse ways to live.2
Similarly, philosophers from the existentialist tradition have been impressed
by the fact that many people feel that morality ceases to matter when they dis-
cover the ideality of values (read: anti-realism). In other words, acts seem to lose
their exigency when we realize that a command to perform them neither issues
from God nor is woven into the fabric of the universe. So Sartre wrote:
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1I intend this formulation to rule out views like constructivism, on which moral truths are
ultimately mind-dependent, and also views like non-cognitivism, according to which (strictly




It is nowhere written that “the good” exists, that one must be hon-
est or must not lie, since we are now upon the plane where there
are only men. Dostoevsky once wrote: “If God did not exist, ev-
erything would be permitted”; and that, for existentialism, is the
starting point.3
I take it that “permitted” here means permitted all things considered, rather than
specifically permitted morally: if there is no source of objective values (because
there is no God, for example), then there is no longer reason to be honest, or
not to lie, or do anything else that is morally required. Of course, this is far too
extreme a reaction to the rejection of moral realism. Sartre himself seems not to
endorse this view fully, calling it only the “starting point” for further reflection.
But it might be optimistic to think that, at the end of reflection, we will be able
to recover all of the importance that we took morality to have when we believed
in the existence of objective values.
At this point, however, one might wonder how realism was supposed to se-
cure the importance of morality at all. Even if there were values laid out by God
or woven into the fabric of the universe, couldn’t we still choose to disregard
them? There seems to be a connection between the existence of cosmic under-
writing for moral values and the authority of those values over us, but it is not
clear what the connection is.
In this paper, I want to vindicate a version of the suspicion that the normative
importance of morality depends on moral realism. More specifically, I want to
show that if teleological forms of moral realism—those that posit an objective
purpose to human life, grounded in some important feature of the universe—
are true, then we will have a distinctive kind of reason to do what morality
requires.4 In doing this, however, I will need to draw a contrast that has been
largely neglected, between teleological versions of moral realism and the kind of
non-naturalist realism familiar in modern-day meta-ethics. One implication of
what I have to say is that neither anti-realism nor non-naturalist realism is able
to secure the normative importance of morality.
Let me make this claim more precise in a few ways. First, I intend to argue
that if teleological forms of realism are true, then the fact that an act is morally
required gives us reason to perform it rather than merely indicates existing reason
3(1945).
4One terminological note: I’m not using “teleology” in the sense that some moral philoso-
phers use it, to indicate moral theories (like consequentialism) that specify the good indepen-
dently of the right. Instead, I’m using “teleology” to talk about the purposes of things.
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to perform it. So this view is distinct from a view on which we have reason to
do what morality requires only because we have independent reason to do the
specific things that it actually requires: to help others, to refrain from harming
them, to be just, and so on. Instead, the claim that I have in mind implies that
if teleological realism is true, then we have reason to do whatever is morally
required, rather than only to do the things that are actually morally required:
in other words, we have reason to do what is morally required, on a de dicto
rather than a de re reading of that claim. (Throughout, I will use “normative
importance” to mean that a set of requirements is reason-giving in this way.)5
Second, I am using “reasons” in Bernard Williams’s sense of internal reasons,
those than an agent can arrive at through a sound deliberative process from his
subjective concerns.6 This is to distinguish my view from those on which the im-
portance of morality comes cheap: certain forms of moral realism, for example,
might just include an auxiliary claim to the effect that we have reason to do what
morality asks of us. Christine Korsgaard accuses such forms of realism of trying
to answer the normative question—why we should do what morality tells us to
do—simply by fiat, by positing the existence of intrinsically normative facts.7
Focusing on internal reasons circumvents this problem: to show that morality
has normative importance in the internal sense requires not just positing the
normativity of morality, but showing how it links up to existing concerns that
we have. (That said, I don’t want to say that we have no external reason to do
what morality requires if teleological realism is false; rather, I simply want to
avoid discussions of external reasons altogether.)
5Why think that the normative importance that people attribute to morality is reason-giving
rather than merely reason-indicating, though? One might think that we have reason to do what
morality requires simply because we have reason to do the specific things that morality requires,
like helping others or not harming them, and we have reason to do these things because the
promotion of well-being or respect for others’ autonomy is intrinsically important. If the intu-
ition is simply that morality has importance in this reason-indicating sense, then we do not need
teleological realism to secure its importance: other meta-ethical views that attribute importance
to things like the promotion of well-being or respecting others’ autonomy will do.
In response, note that this would not allow for the possibility of the motive of duty: that is,
being motivated to do something by the mere thought that it is the right thing to do. When
people are motivated by this thought alone, then presumably they think that the mere fact that
an act is right provides them with reason to perform it; the belief that they have reason to
perform the act then motivates them to perform it. If this is correct, then people must take




My use of internal reasons might seem to conflict with what I have about the
reason-giving quality of moral facts. But the conflict is only apparent: claims
that we have internal reason to do something and that moral facts are reason-
giving (rather than only reason-indicating) track two separate dimensions of
counterfactual variation. It is possible that the fact that an act is morally re-
quired gives us reason to perform it, but also that its reason-giving quality is
enabled by our having certain subjective concerns. (Analogously, the fact that
a young child’s mother has told him to do something might give him reason to
do it, even if he has reason for that only because he is afraid that she will punish
him if he does not.)
So here is the claim that I want to defend in this paper: If teleological forms
of realism are true, then the fact that an act is morally required gives us internal
reason to perform it. In contrast, if anti-realism or non-naturalist realism is true
instead, then we have no reason to think that moral facts give us internal reasons
for action. I plan to demonstrate this by showing that if and only if teleological
forms of realism are true, then doing what is morally required (whatever that
turns out to be) can connect us to something larger and more significant than
ourselves. This can infuse our lives with meaning, so that anyone with concern
for meaning has reason to follow moral requirements. This would be a way
of securing the importance of morality by showing how we can incorporate a
concern for its requirements into a eudaimonic perspective.
I admit that this is not a reason that exists for all human beings or rational
agents. Nonetheless, the desire for meaning is something that is part of the
psychology of many people: we want our lives to be connected to what matters
in the grand scheme of things, rather than to be frictionless orbs adrift in ethical
space. For most of us, then, such a concern will give us reason to do what
morality requires if the forms of realism that I have in mind are true.
Let me outline the paper. In sections one and two, I lay out and discuss the
ingredients of the argument. Because the argument rests heavily on the idea that
morality can provide a life with meaning, I give, in §1, an account of a life’s
having meaning. And in §2, I spell out teleological moral realism and contrast
it with a version of moral realism that is more familiar to modern meta-ethics.
Next, in §3, I argue that if teleological moral realism is true, then doing whatever
is morally required can provide a life with meaning, so that (given that we desire
meaning) we have reason to do whatever is morally required. In §4, I argue
that neither anti-realism nor non-naturalist realism can support the normative
importance of morality in a similar way. These two claims establish that the
normative importance of morality depends on the truth of teleological realism.
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Finally, in §5, I respond to objections.
William Frankena wrote that “morality is made for man, not man for moral-
ity.”8 But if the forms of realism that I have in mind are true, this dichotomy
might be simplistic: man might follow morality for the reason that, in doing so,
he gives his own life meaning.
1 Meaning
Let me start, then, by discussing meaning. I want to note that when ordinary
people talk about “meaning in life” or “the meaning of life,” they might have
a number of things in mind. Nonetheless, I take it that there is one important
cluster of ideas that people often have in mind when they talk about meaning,
which I will look at in this section.
As a preliminary, I want to distinguish between meaning and a sense of pur-
pose, which I understand to be a set of dispositions to pursue a goal and to feel
satisfaction or disappointment if one succeeds or fails at that goal. Colloquially,
having a life with meaning is different from merely having something that one
lives for. Playing video games or linking an entire box of paperclips can pro-
vide a person with a sense of purpose, if only temporarily, although they are
fairly meaningless pursuits. At a purely physiological level, taking certain kinds
of stimulants can give someone a sense of purpose for a few hours, although it
surely does not make one’s life more meaningful for that duration. Even a sus-
tained sense of purpose, something that animates a person’s entire life, might
not be enough to give that life meaning: someone might endure the day-to-day
with the belief that it will allow him to retire comfortably one day; but we have
the intuition that such a life would not thereby have much meaning. Conversely,
although it is harder to think of cases here, one can live a life that has important
components of meaning without having much of a sense of purpose: an artist
might be painting what will be recognized centuries later as an artistic master-
piece, although he finds work on the piece completely unrewarding and works
on it only because he needs to pay off his debts. Of course, what provides many
people with a sense of purpose in life—say, some creative, scholarly, or human-
itarian endeavor—is something that is meaningful; but meaning and a sense of
purpose can clearly come apart.
If there is no necessary connection between having a sense of purpose and
meaning, then what does meaning amount to? In answering this question, I
want to draw on one cluster of views held by different philosophers who have
8(1973).
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discussed the question. What these views share is the idea that a life receives
meaning by engaging in, or being positively connected to something that is an
appropriate object of positive attitudes like valuing, love, or awe. Robert Noz-
ick, for example, writes: “Meaning involves transcending limits so as to connect
with something valuable.”9 Similarly, Charles Taylor proposes that, in order
for something to have meaning, it must merit emotions like love, awe, and so
on; what gives our lives meaning must be something that is lovable or awe-
inspiring.10 In the same vein, Susan Wolf writes that “meaning arises from lov-
ing objects worthy of love and engaging with them in a positive way. . . meaning
arises when subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness.”11
Instead of talking about something’s being an appropriate object of a group
of attitudes (valuing, love, awe, attraction, and so on), I’ll just say that that thing
is important or matters. This difference in terminology is purely for the sake of
simplicity, and I don’t intend what I say to conflict in a substantive way with any
of the accounts that I just mentioned. In these terms, what is necessary for a life
to have meaning is that it engage in, or be positively connected to something that
matters.12 I will call this condition—connection to or participation in something
that is important—significance. My claim, then, is that significance is at least one
important component of meaning.
As one piece of evidence that significance is a condition on meaning, let
us consider some paradigmatic examples of lives that are meaningful, and ones
of those that are meaningless. Consider, for example, someone who devotes
her life to humanitarian work, who works to eradicate a widespread disease,
or to break the cycle of poverty in a destitute region of the world; or think
of someone who dedicates his life to creative or scholarly pursuits, who creates
innovative works of art or makes theoretical breakthroughs in a field of study.
Most of us think that these people have meaningful lives. Why? Because their
lives are positively connected to—they advance—certain important projects: the
eradication of disease, the creation of a new art form, scientific discovery, and
so on. In contrast, consider someone who lives a paradigmatically meaningless
life: we might think of someone who lacks deep relationships with other people,
91981, p. 610. Italics mine.
10(1989).
112010, pp. 8f. Italics mine.
12I’m going to remain neutral on the meta-ethics of mattering or being important. Although
moral realism is congenial to realism about mattering, we need not endorse the latter view in
order to get the account going. Similarly, I’m not going to provide anything like a theory of
what matters; I’ll simply rely on intuitions that ordinary people have.
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who does not contribute to his community, who lacks interesting hobbies, and
who neglects self-development. We find his life meaningless precisely because he
is not connected, in any significant way, to anything that matters. In our terms,
his life lacks significance, while the paradigmatically meaningful ones have it. So
significance seems to be one important part of what we have in mind when we
say that a life is meaningful.
Of course, perhaps people also have other things in mind when they talk
about meaning. People often speak of “the meaning of life,” as if it were the
solution to a puzzle; perhaps they also have in mind something that can provide
one with a sense of clarity, an understanding of why one exists and what one
should do. But this sense of meaning is more obscure, and I will put it aside,
without intending to rule it out.
2 Two kinds of moral realism
Now, the main claim of the paper is that the normative importance of morality
depends on the truth of a specific form of moral realism, since the truth of that
kind of realism allows doing what is morally required to give our lives meaning.
Having finished discussing meaning, I want now to get clear on the version of
realism that I have in mind.
I want to start by drawing a contrast to the familiar kind of non-naturalist
realism that has currency in meta-ethics nowadays. Modern-day non-naturalist
realism makes two claims: (1) there are objective moral facts; (2) moral prop-
erties are irreducible to non-moral properties, and moral facts are distinct from
other kinds of facts. So according to non-naturalist realism, morality is objective
and sui generis, autonomous from and discontinuous with other subject mat-
ters.13 Russ Shafer-Landau, for example, writes that “it appears that moral val-
ues are something very different in kind from anything else that we are familiar
with,” and suggests that we “take [this appearance] at face value, and introduce
into our ontology a sui generis category of values.”14 And David Enoch defines
his favored position, Robust Realism, as “the thesis that there are objective ir-
reducibly normative truths.”15 (Of course, Enoch is talking about normative
realism in general rather than moral realism, but we can extend his definition to
13I want to note that I’m excluding divine command theory, which grounds moral properties
in supernatural (hence non-natural) properties, from “non-naturalist realism.” I’m using the
term to pick out the kind of view popular in meta-ethics nowadays, according to which moral





Note that proponents of non-naturalism have resisted saying much about
what morality is supposed to be, say, by connecting it to some other subject
matter. Of course, we are told that moral facts are objective and normative, but
often not much positive is said beyond that. In this regard, non-naturalist realists
are like negative theologians, trying to describe God in terms of the qualities he
lacks (e.g., being spatio-temporally located) rather than has. (Think of the termi-
nology: moral properties are non-natural; they are sui generis, unlike anything
else.)
In contrast, the teleological forms of moral realism that I have in mind are
package deals, comprising a metaphysics and a substantive moral theory. They
present morality as being continuous with theology, or cosmology, or biol-
ogy. Such views are positive, embodying a conception of human life: first, they
present a picture of how humanity fits into the universe as a whole, one that in-
volves the intentions of God or some important aspect of the universe itself; sec-
ond, they claim that there is an objective purpose to human life that is grounded
in these things, and whose content is connected in a straightforward way to the
location of humanity in the universe; finally, they claim that morality is a matter
of living in accordance with the purpose of human life.16 (I’m using “purpose”
differently here, of course, from how I use it in “sense of purpose.”) At this
point, let’s not stipulate that purposes are intrinsically normative, so that we
automatically have reason to live in accordance with our purpose; that would be
doing what Korsgaard criticizes, making morality normative by fiat. Nonethe-
less, notice that purposes amount to requirements on human life (whether or
not we have reason to obey them) from God or some important feature of the
universe.
Such forms of moral realism embody a conception of morality as a matter
of living in accordance with the purpose of the kind that one belongs to. Ac-
cordingly, the basic moral terms will not be thin ones like “right” or “wrong,”
but ones describing a match or mismatch between one’s behavior and purpose:
16I don’t want to lean too much on the term “moral”; it’s conceptually possible for the content
of morality on this way of defining it to be quite different from what we typically take it to be,
as having to do with things like our obligations to other people. (One could imagine a possible
world in which the purpose of human life is to link as many paperclips together as possible; in
such a world, what morality requires us to do has nothing inherently to do with our behavior
toward others.) Nonetheless, what fulfilling the purpose of human life involves on the views I
consider overlaps considerably with morality, in the usual sense, so I’m not just changing the
subject here.
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“fitting” and “not fitting,” “appropriate” and “inappropriate.” In the remainder
of this section, I want to mention briefly a few examples of such views.
Take, first, a traditional Christian conception of human life. On this ac-
count, an all-powerful god created human beings (different traditions tell dif-
ferent stories here) for his glory, for companionship, or to help carry out his
plan for creation. (Take Isaiah 43:7: “Even every one that is called by my name:
for I have created him for my glory, I have formed him.”) Hence God is both
the source of the purpose of human life and part of its content: God’s inten-
tions ground the purpose of human life, and that purpose involves him centrally.
Morality, on such a view, is just living in accordance with this divinely-intended
purpose: what is appropriate for human beings is to glorify God, to act in accor-
dance with his plans, to keep his laws, and so on.
Turn now to Stoicism. It is tempting to read the Stoics as simply offering
practical advice for maintaining your tranquility in a world shot through with
chance, but that was not the intention behind their teachings. Rather, their
ethics derives from their metaphysics. According to their metaphysical system,
God is identical to reason (logos), the active substance of the universe; the evolu-
tion of the universe itself is the result of reason’s acting on the passive substance,
matter, in accordance with the principles contained in the former. Hence there
is something like a divine plan for the universe, although (unlike in Christianity)
this plan is immanent in the universe itself. So the purpose of human life (and
the purpose of everything else) is to live in accordance with these principles of
cosmic evolution. Since everything that happens is a manifestation of this, not
wanting things to go differently from how they actually go is a sign of submis-
sion to the underlying principles of the universe: a sign that one knows one’s
place, so to speak.17
Now, take classical Confucian ethics. Here, the source of morality is Heaven
(tian), conceived of as a personal deity or (in later times) as the natural order
of things.18 According to this view, the social order reflects the intentions or
structure of Heaven, so the purpose of human life is to play the roles appropriate
to the social position that one finds oneself in: “Let the ruler be a ruler; the
minister, a minister; the father, a father; the son, a son.”19
Finally, let’s look at Aristotelian ethics. Aristotle held that the purpose of
human life is picked out by the activities that make human beings distinctive
17See, for example, Nicholas White’s introduction to his translation of Epictetus’ Handbook.
18See, for example, Louden (2002).
19Analects 12:11.
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from other forms of life, and he took this to be rational activity. Hence it is
appropriate for human beings to act rationally, and living a good life is exer-
cising the rational capacity in accordance with certain forms of excellence. It
is controversial whether Aristotle thought that anything unified grounds that
purpose. He clearly thinks that the purpose of human life issues from our na-
ture, but he seems to think (e.g., in The Metaphysics) of nature as belonging to
individuals: an inner principle of development, rather than a unified feature of
the cosmos. Nonetheless, Aristotle talks of natural justice and certain political
systems as “naturally best,”20 so he seems to think that nature is important—it is
an appropriate object of respect—even if it is individualized rather than unified.
The descriptions of these moral views are admittedly cursory. I provide
them, however, simply to illustrate a general phenomenon, fully aware that I
have simplified or omitted important features about each view. Again, the views
share several components: (1) important, high-level features of human life are
explained in terms of God’s intentions or important aspects of the universe it-
self; (2) these things ground an objective purpose to human life, whose content
has to do with the features explained; (3) it is morally appropriate for human
being to live in accordance with this purpose. In other terms, these views say
that the nature of morality consists in requirements on human life generated by
God, nature, etc.; the content of morality is to fulfill the purpose of human life,
which consists in living in accordance with God’s plan, wanting things to go as
they do, acting rationally, performing one’s social roles, and so on.
Notice again how much these forms of moral realism differ from the realism
that many modern-day philosophers hold, the bare thesis that there are mind-
independent moral facts, distinct from and irreducible to other kinds of facts.
Non-naturalist realists make no effort to locate a source for morality, nor do
they try to connect it to a philosophical anthropology, an account of what hu-
man beings are and what their purpose is. Perhaps non-naturalist realism is more
plausible precisely because it has less baggage; but, as the next section will show,
because it lacks the additional commitments, we have no reason to think that
it can allow doing what is morally required to provide one’s life with meaning,
and so secure the normative importance of morality either.
3 How teleological realism secures the importance of morality
I have discussed the notion of meaning that I have in mind, and distinguished
the teleological forms of realism that I want to focus on from non-naturalist
20Nicomachean Ethics, V.7.
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realism. In this section, I want to argue that if the teleological forms of realism
that we discussed are true, then doing what is morally required—that is, living in
accordance with the purpose of human life, whatever that is—provides meaning.
I also want to show, in the next section, that if rival meta-ethical views (like
anti-realism or non-naturalist realism) are true instead, no such obedience to
morality can provide meaning, whatever the prospects of deriving meaning from
other routes are. This means that, for people who have a desire for meaning,
teleological moral realism will secure a distinctive reason to do what morality
requires, one that does not exist if either anti-realism or non-naturalist realism is
true instead. The upshot is that if teleological realism is true, then morality has
normative importance; conversely, if it is false, then we have no reason to think
that morality has normative importance.
Recall the conception of meaning that we are interested in, meaning as signif-
icance: in order for my life to have meaning, it must be connected in a positive
way to something important. Now, consider the teleological forms of moral re-
alism that we just discussed, each of which assigns a purpose to human life. As
we discussed, that purpose amounts to a requirement on human life established
by God or some aspect of the universe itself, which are things of importance:
they are objects that merit our respect or awe. So in living in accordance with
the purpose of human life, whatever that purpose is, I fulfill a requirement set
by an entity of importance, thereby connecting myself positively with that im-
portant entity. In living in accordance with the divine plan, or submitting to
the cosmic flow, or performing my social roles, I am doing what God or Nature
requires of me, which creates a positive connection between me and God or Na-
ture. So according to these views, my life gains significance, hence meaning, by
my acting in accordance with the purpose of human life: that is, by my doing
whatever is morally appropriate.
Notice that what does the work here is not any intrinsic authority that what-
ever gives human life its purpose has; in other words, I am not securing the nor-
mativity of morality simply by building normativity into its source. I am not
assuming that, in advance of any desires or goals that we have, we have reason to
obey God or to live in accordance with Nature. Rather, I am assuming only that
whatever gives human life its purpose, on the versions of teleological realism
that we considered, is an appropriate object of positive attitudes like love, awe,
valuing, and so on. Nor is this an attempt to explain the importance of moral-
ity simply by positing a source with importance, on the reading of this claim in
which “importance” has the same meaning throughout. Disambiguating, I am
trying instead to show that we have reason to do what morality requires because
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it is underwritten by a feature of the universe that merits our love or awe.
Now, my argument requires attributing a widespread desire for meaning
to human beings, and one might object that this smacks of intellectualization.
People do not seek meaning, the objection goes; only philosophers (or angsty
teenagers or depressives) do that. I concede that ordinary people may only sel-
dom talk about meaning; nonetheless, it does seem to have the importance of
a need for many. After all, many people do want their lives to contribute to
the big picture. (This is why reflection on the ultimate demise of humanity, or
even more mundane things, like civilizational decline—in short, anything that
makes us aware of how small a part of the big picture anything that we could
contribute to makes up—can be profoundly unsettling: it makes us think that
the grounds of the meaning in our lives are themselves meaningless.) Perhaps
talk of meaning is limited precisely because most people think their lives are
meaningful enough, so that it’s only when we feel disoriented or depressed that
we consciously look for meaning.
4 Does morality have importance without teleological realism?
One might wonder if rivals to teleological moral realism can secure the norma-
tive importance of morality in the same way. I want to argue that, if anti-realism
or non-naturalist realism is true, then it is not true that doing whatever morality
requires provides our lives with meaning. If this is so, then we have no reason
to think that either anti-realism or non-naturalist realism can secure the impor-
tance of morality. Let me discuss anti-realism first, then non-naturalist realism.
First, note that if anti-realism is true, morality is no longer something that
is metaphysically underwritten by any important feature of the universe. After
all, anti-realists will say that moral truths are constituted by being the outputs of
some deliberative procedure, or that moral claims express non-cognitive states,
and so on. On any of these stories, the source of morality is not an entity that
has objective importance.21 So in doing what is morally required on the anti-
realist picture, we are not thereby connecting ourselves to anything that could
provide our life with meaning. Hence anti-realism does not secure the normative
importance of morality in the same way that teleological realism does.
One might think that there are other ways my life could still have mean-
ing through some connection to morality, even if anti-realism is true. Moral
21Pace Kant’s remark that the moral law within is a constant source of awe, I take it that most
people would not think that merely meeting the requirements of Kantian rationality would give
their lives meaning.
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philosophers, for example, have sometimes talked about the ability of moral-
ity to provide meaning because of its content. Morality might recommend, for
example, a life devoted to the good of mankind; in living such a life, I derive
meaning from being positively connected to the well-being of others, which is
something that matters.
The problem with this is that it shows that we have reason only to do the spe-
cific things that are morally required, rather than to do what is morally required
as such. It therefore cannot vindicate the normative importance of morality, its
giving us reason for certain acts rather than merely indicating that we have rea-
son to perform those acts. Put another way, we can derive meaning through be-
ing moral because the content of morality is what it actually is; but teleological
realism allows doing what is morally required to provide meaning in a different
way, not through the content of moral requirements, but simply through their
nature: a set of prescriptions that are underwritten by God or the universe.
So this is not to deny that there are other routes to meaning if anti-realism
is true. I can still derive significance by connecting my life to things of impor-
tance. What I deny is simply that doing what is morally required (read de dicto)
can provide meaning if anti-realism is true. This does mean, however, that one
important reason to do what morality requires if teleological moral realism is
true will be absent if anti-realism is true instead.
Now, one might think that this concedes too much. If there are more mun-
dane routes to meaning, then this undermines the importance of morality even if
teleological forms of realism are true. After all, if my life already has meaning—
if I am already working toward important goals—then why do what morality
requires, if the relevant reason for doing so is that it will provide my life with
meaning? Why should the humanitarian working to eradicate a widespread dis-
ease, or the scientist who makes great advancements to human knowledge, care
about what God or Nature requires? In response, notice that significance is grad-
able rather than binary: something can be more significant than another, even
if they are both significant to some degree. Insofar as the significance of my life
depends on the importance of whatever it is connected to or engages in, my life
has much more significance if that thing is as all-encompassing as God or the
universe. So doing what morality requires, if teleological realism is true, can
still provide my life with additional meaning even once it has some meaning,
and my reason for doing what it requires is not undermined by the presence of
meaning in my life.
Finally, I want to argue that non-naturalist moral realism does not secure
the normative importance of morality in the way that teleological moral re-
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alism does. First, note that we have no reason to think that morality is some-
thing of intrinsic importance if non-naturalism is correct, precisely because non-
naturalism does not say much about the nature of moral requirements. It does
not, for example, ground moral properties in properties of some subject mat-
ter whose importance we have clear intuitions about. Given that moral values
are sui generis, what reason do we have to think that they are like any of the
other things that we consider important? And second, the claim that something
is of importance is a striking claim: after all, the proportion of things that are
appropriate objects of love or awe is low, so we should start off with a low cre-
dence that some given thing has importance. The burden of proof, then, is on
the non-naturalist to show that morality is something of importance, and I have
just argued that they have not done this.
Note that this does not establish with anything like certainty that morality
lacks importance if non-naturalist realism is correct. But in the absence of any
reason to think that it does have such importance if non-naturalist realism is
correct, we should think that it does not. So I conclude that if non-naturalism
is true, then doing what is morally required would not thereby give our lives
meaning.
Nonetheless, most people through human history have accepted (if tacitly) a
more substantive form of moral realism, on which morality is supported by an
entity that has importance. The acceptance of the familiar kind of non-naturalist
realism, on the other hand, has taken off only recently, and is confined largely to
philosophers. In light of this, we might conjecture that the loss of meaning that
many people experience when they come to abandon moral realism is really a
response to abandoning the teleological forms of realism that I have discussed.
When we see that moral requirements do not have their source in anything that
is an appropriate object of love or awe, we see that our lives do not gain meaning
by following them, and lose part of the reason that we took ourselves to have to
follow them in the first place.
In fact, it is easy to construct a story for why modern-day non-naturalist re-
alism gives morality the appearance of normative importance or authority, even
if it really lacks it. In other words, if non-naturalist realism is true, then it is
easy to explain away our intuition that morality has authority at all. On this
story, morality inherits the appearance of authority from traditional, more sub-
stantive conceptions of morality on which its source is some significant feature
of the universe, from which morality is supposed to derive its authority. But
while non-naturalist realism gives up the idea that morality is connected to any
such source, it has not yet given up the idea that morality has authority. All
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of this confirms Anscombe’s claim that, in the aftermath of the death of teleol-
ogy, the moral “ought” has become “a word of mere mesmeric force,” one that
has no real meaning anymore, but that is still able to draw on its old emotional
associations.22
5 Objections
One objection to the overall argument is that there might be widespread desires
other than those for meaning that can make moral facts reason-giving without
relying on teleological realism. If so, then the normative importance of morality
does not depend on teleological realism. One promising candidate for such a
desire, for example, might be a desire to be a morally upright person: to do
what is morally required of me, whatever that may be.
In response to such an objection, however, think about what such a desire
would amount to if teleological realism is false, in other words, if morality does
not have its source in any object of importance. In that case, the desire to do
whatever is morally required would seem strange, being simply a desire to follow
a set of disembodied commands. And we might wonder whether anyone, upon
full reflection, would endorse such a desire at all.
In a similar vein, Michael Smith notes that good people are typically mo-
tivated by substantive moral concerns, like the well-being of their loved ones,
justice, equality, and so on, rather than by the mere thought that something is
morally required. “Indeed,” he writes, “commonsense tells us that being so mo-
tivated [to do what is morally required as such] is a fetish or moral vice, not the
one and only moral virtue.”23 Doing what is morally required simply because it
is morally required—at least, in the absence of any background story about the
importance of moral requirements as such—might seem fetishistic or perverse.
And to the extent that we think that such a desire is a vice, we might think that
the desire does not give us reason to fulfill it, since any normative force that it
has is canceled by the fact that it is a vice.
Why wouldn’t my own view, though, be vulnerable to this point? After all,
I am trying to show that if teleological realism is correct, then we have reason to
do what morality requires de dicto, and this seems equally open to the charge of
fetishizing morality. But in response to this point, note that teleological realism
has a fuller story to tell about the nature of moral requirements: for something




of human life. In being motivated by the belief that an act is morally required,
I am motivated by the belief that the act is required of me by some important
entity or feature of the universe, and by a feeling of love or awe toward that
entity. Now, a fetish is inordinate concern for something, and it is not inordinate
to be motivated by love or awe toward what merits it: to fear God or to submit
to the cosmic flow, assuming that such things really exist. So being motivated
to do what is morally required as such, if teleological realism is true, need not
fetishize morality.
Conclusion
Let me conclude. I have argued that teleological forms of moral realism, those
framed in terms of an objective purpose of human life, can secure the normative
importance of morality. I have argued for this by showing that, if these kinds
of realism are true, then doing what is morally required can provide a life with
meaning, a widespread human need. After all, meaning arises when I positively
connect my life to an object of importance, and these views present morality as
having its source in exactly those objects. I have also argued that nothing similar
is possible if anti-realism or non-naturalist realism is true: rival views preserve
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